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 ABSTACT  
The government spends 500 billion NOK on Public procurement each year. This amounts to 
16 % of the total gross revenue. Both the government and the public have great focus on this 
money to be spent in an economically advantageous way.  The introduction of new public 
management in public governance was a way to introduce a business mind set, and run 
government entities more like a business, to inspire cost saving and financial control. 
  
My research was conducted as a case study with three cases using relevant theory and the 
rules and regulations for public procurement as a foundation. It started with as an aspiration to 
gain a better understanding of why price seemed to be the determining factor for procurement 
competitions where it publicly had been stated that quality should be the determining factor. 
For all cases quality had the highest weight and yet the offer with the low price was awarded 
the contract. The public dialog about these procurements made it sound like quality had been 
sacrificed for a low price, and part of me expected that to be in my findings. What I found 
was that in a competition with negotiations the principal is able to guide suppliers towards the 
optimum quality. The offered quality from suppliers become more similar, thus making price 
the factor were suppliers can differentiate themselves in the evaluation. The fact that price 
becomes the determining factor does not weakening the importance of quality for the 
procurement. During my research I found all contract awards conducted according to basic 
procurement principles and I started to wonder - why is it that we have such different 
expectations for the result of a public procurement and what it should deliver? Expectations 
isn't only for the government to spend our money wisely, it often seem like there is an 
expectation that one should get the best quality at the lowest price. I decided to explore what 
it is that influence these expectations, and what it is that separate public and private 
procurement practises.  
 
I noticed that even if I have a background from procurement, my view and expectations of the 
results of public procurement competition should achieve, are influenced by different 
stakeholders communication and the media coverage. My own personal conviction could also 
have been part of clouding my judgement, making me assume that quality had been sacrificed 
for a low price when in reality the quality for all three cases were quite similar. Choosing the 
economically most adventurous offer is what we based on theory expect and yet we let 
feelings cloud our judgement when it comes to viewing the results for public procurement. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and background 
 Our expectation of the level of services delivered by the government has never been higher, 
and at the same time the focus on cutting costs within public management is increasing. 
Public procurement is a governing tool that can be used introducing competition for areas 
where there are traditional monopolies. Public procurement services can be used as a way to 
cut cost but also as a policy tool. However, the introduction of competition and the use of 
public suppliers is a sensible issue, and opinions are characterised by ideology more than 
facts.  The introduction of competition is acknowledged as a way to save money within public 
procurement. Services previously being rendered by the government, is being set out for 
competition, allowing the public unity to bid for the service they previously had monopoly 
providing, in competition with private entities. With the introduction of ex-ante competition, 
it is said to have a cost saving potential up to 20 percent, and it has therefore become a 
popular way for governments to save money, often claiming they will get more quality for 
less cost (Domberger, Jensen, 1997, p. 68).  Putting services out for competition is not 
without its challenges. In order to do so successfully one has to develop a detailed scope of 
work that will enable suppliers to bid on the services needed, and also one need to ensure that 
the evaluation criteria set for the procurement covers what was the need for the procurement 
in the first place. For large complex procurement setting evaluation criteria can be 
challenging, and preferably it should be able be measure  “apple for apple”, but in reality it is 
often not this simple. Complex procurements with service in the evaluation form may be hard 
to measure objectively up against each other.    
 
This research started with a desire to investigate why price seemed to end up being the 
determining in procurements where the determining factor was said to be quality. I wanted to 
explore the difference between price and quality as evaluation criteria and explore if quality 
was “sacrificed for a good price”. I decided to do so through a case study of public 
procurements recently conducted. Throughout my research I discovered that the expectation 
to what a public procurement should achieve is different from our expectation to procurement 
in general, often our expectation to the result of a competition seems to be the opposite of 
what is the logical choice. I therefore wanted to explore what influences our expectations, and 
how it affects our view of the results of a public procurement competition.  
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1.1 Purpose and research question 
I started this research with a desire to learn more about the relationship between price and 
quality in evaluations. What inspired this desire was several procurements were quality is said 
to be the determining factor, still it was offer with the lowest price who won the competition.  
 
By reading the papers I had an impression quality would be most important and still the 
lowest price and I wanted to explore why. The public debate left an impression that quality 
was sacrificed to save cost and I was interested to explore if this was the case. I decided to 
explore the relationship between price and quality in an evaluation, and determine what 
factors influenced them.  
 
- Research question 1:  
What are the relationship between price and quality in an evaluation and how is it 
affected by the choice of procurement procedure? Is quality being sacrificed for a low 
price? 
 
Through my discoveries I started to ponder about another question, do we have different 
expectations to what results a public procurement should achieve compared to the 
expectations for procurement in general? One of the main reasons for introducing competition 
is a desire to cut cost, and promote innovation, within areas that often have a natural 
monopoly. Yet, when contract award is to the supplier offering the lowest price, we are left 
with an impression quality is being sacrificed. It made me wonder why we have such different 
expectations to the result of public procurement and what is it that influences these 
expectations?  
- Research question 2:   
Why do we have different expectations for public procurement and how are these 
expectations influenced? 
 
This paper is conduced as a case study and it’s based on the Procurement of: 
- Ambulance Helicopter Services  
- Air ambulance aircraft  
-  “Trafikkpakke 1 - Sør”  - operation of the Norwegian railroad.  
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I also wanted to look into Trafikkpakke 2 and 3, but was not able to retrieve any 
documentation from Jernbaneverket.   
 
These cases were chosen because they have been criticised for sacrificing quality for price 
and claims have been made that they haven’t been conducted according to the rules of public 
procurement.  The aim for this paper is to offer insight in what it is that affects the evaluation 
result for price and our own opinions and different stakeholders influence quality and how our 
views of the results achieved through public procurement. 
 
1.2  Limitations 
This paper is conducted on the basis of information available through the media, tender 
documents and contract award. The evaluation model was all for all three cases classified as 
an internal document and not possible to gain access to. This limits the analysis of the 
evaluation. The evaluation is only reviewed at with data of the final evaluation round, in the 
preliminary round there were several suppliers who submitted offers, who wasn’t invited to 
the final round of negotiations. These offers are not accounted for in this paper.   
 
1.3 Structure  
This thesis is organised with one section focusing on theory and a section for introduction and 
analysis of the cases and the influences affecting our view on public procurement. Chapter 1 
is a general introduction of the paper and a presentation of the research question. Chapter 2 is 
a presentation theory for procurement in general, the rules and regulation for public 
procurement and theory for how different stakeholders have conflicting goals for public 
procurement. In chapter 3 theory about the methodology is presented and the research method 
for the thesis. It is followed by chapter 4, who has a review of the interviews for how a 
competition with negotiation affect the evaluation of price and quality and then a introduction 
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and a review of all the cases. It is followed by an analysis of the evaluation and the 
importance of the evaluation criteria price and quality. Chapter 5 is an analysis of how the 
different influences have the ability to affect our view on public procurement, and how their 
behaviour influenced what has been written and the perception for each case. Chapter 6 is a 
summary and conclusion for all findings in this paper 
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Chapter 2   Theory  
2.1 Procurement - basic theory 
One of the main goals for an organisation when conducting procurement is to ensure they get 
best value for money in their procurement decisions (Valletti, Dini, & Pacini, 2009, p1). The 
use of competitive tendering is recognized as a procurement procedure that ensures 
competition. A competition is often an incentive for suppliers to reduce their prices, allowing 
the buyer to pay market price. An open competition allows for transparency and can act as a 
safeguard against corruption. The use of competitive tendering helps identify who is able to 
produce the goods or service at the right quality, to the lowest price.  (Valletti, Dini & Pacini, 
2009, p 136). All procurement is conducted to achieve a goal. For private consumers goals are 
informal and for a company there most likely will have been conducted a strategy process 
defining what goals they aim to achieve. The common goal is to get most value for our 
money. What is considered the best value will vary, and there is always give and take between 
the price and quality. Even if there is no formal process for this trade-off, considerations are 
made to determine how much one is willing to pay to achieve more quality. For a private 
consumer this is an internal process based on preferences and for a company it is a more 
formal process that allows them to identify risk and the best opportunities. It is conducted in a 
uniform process that allows for an easy identification of the best value. (Schooner, Gordon, & 
Clark , 2008, p 6) 
 
2.2 Public procurement 
Each year the Norwegian government spends approximately 500 million NOK on goods and 
services, making public procurement an important activity (Isaksen, T.R, 2019). Spending this 
much money not only is it important to spend it wisely and according the rules and regulation, 
it can also be a tool to inflict political policy (Lundberg & Bergman, 2011, p 4) A trend of 
privatisation in the public sector started in the UK in the 70is and for a long time it was 
considered to be the profitable choice compared to contracting out.  A leadership article in the 
Financial Times November 1986 would be the start of changing this view, stating the loss of 
public ownership i.e privatisation as less profitable as contracting. In Norway new public 
management was introduced by the first Stoltenberg government who took office in 2000 
(Kagge, 2014). New public management is a way to organise and govern public entities to 
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achieve increased legitimacy and efficiency inspired by the principles from the private sector 
(Doksheim, 2020). It can be seen as the introduction for privatisation and contracting out in 
Norway and the use has only increased with the conservative Solberg government, who 
naturally focuses even more on privatisation and contracting out as their sourcing strategy. 
 
The government sets the direction for public purchasing, and define directions and focus 
areas. It can be a tool for the government to fulfil public policy, used to achieve 
environmental goals, or working conditions requiring suppliers to have a system in place, but 
also goals about reducing public spending, and also more use of private suppliers within 
public services ((Torvatn & de Boer, 2017, p4) (Lundberg & Bergman, 2011, p 4). 
 
Contracting out “means opening up to competition a set of economic activities which were 
previously immune from it. It is the element of ex-ante competition; “competition for the 
market as opposed to competition in it”, that is the cost saving factor (Domberger et al, 1997, 
p 2) It doesn't mean transfer of ownership nor that the task won't be conducted by the 
government, it means that both the public and private entities bid on the same contract and 
one chooses the best offer for a given time period. It is not only a way to identify who can 
supply the service at the right quality, to the lowest price, but also seen as a way to safeguard 
against corruption, and offer equal opportunities to all suppliers, and save money (Valletti, 
Dini, & Pacini, 2009, p 136). Time and research has proven that competition can be a cost 
saving factor (Domberger, 1998, p. 160). Since it is the competition and not transfer of 
ownership that is the cost saving factor, contracting out is said to contribute to savings, even 
when the service is won by the public organisations. The theory is that competition will 
sharpen all parties involved and give the government more value for money and can be an 
important management tool for the government to make “make or buy” decisions (Domberger 
& Rimer, 1994). It offers the possibility to test the market, to determine the best supplier 
based on price and non-price criteria.  
 
As privatisation, contracting out can be a politically charged question. For many it is seen as a 
concealed way to privatise public sector. Others see contracting out as a method available to 
reform public sector, and unlike actual privatisation it does not involve sale of public 
ownership. Competition can stimulate to cost reduction, innovation and efficiency and it is 
said to have a cost saving expectancy of 20 percent (Domberger, Jensen, 1997, p. 68). The 
method is not without any drawbacks and even if the ex-ante competition offers the potential 
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of savings, not all public services are well suited for competition. It is also important to know 
that competition comes with a cost, there are costs for planning and conduct the competition, 
writing contracts and everything it entails while actually increasing cost, which is an 
important factor to calculate in. 
  
The debate on the subject is often driven by ideological views more than facts (Domberger et 
al, 1997, p 70). Research has defined some areas of service more suitable than others, 
cleaning, catering and waste management services will raise less emotions than “prisons, 
welfare and other human services” (Domberger p 165). The latter are areas where “personal 
contact between the client and the provider is extensive, and where the provider needs to 
exercise judgement, force, care and compassion as part of the service delivery”. This view is 
reflected also in how Norwegian use of public contracting has been, where cleaning, catering 
and waste management has been contracted out without much controversy. In the latter year 
there has been a switch in the use of areas where contracting out is used such as services for 
“the National air ambulance service of Norway” and for Bane NOR and the operations of the 
railroad, which has caused much more controversial in the public debate. Privatising public 
services has since the introduction been a sensible subject, still the government will always 
seek “to spend public funding better and more efficiently, while contributing to solve social 
challenges within the country” (Isaksen, R, 2019). Contracting out can be seen as a way for 
the government to remain ownership and still modernise the public sector and get more value 
for money through competition.  
 
In addition to traditional procurement goals as to get the best value for money, public 
procurement also has transparency, accountability and integrity as goals. These goals are 
regulated by law or regulations, and can reduce flexibility. One of the purposes of these goals 
is to safeguard against corruption and ensure openness. There are also social and economical 









2.3 The difference between private and public sector 
procurement 
When the motivation behind the purchase is governed solely by economic motives the make 
or buy decision is simple, use whichever is cheapest. However the public sector has many 
other considerations to take into account such as social objectives, accountability, equity 
considerations and security of supply (Domberger and Rimer, 1994). There are also the 
external demands of transparency, integrity, accountability and exemplary behaviour. A 
public organization's internal demands consist of the internal goals such as cost efficiency and 
delivery of service and also the goals of the general public. The internal goal and the goals of 
the public are often conflicting. For instance there might not be room in the budget for the 
level of service the public expects the public to provide them. Government officials will often 
use public procurement as a tool for their goals 
Public procurement is dependent on funds that are granted through budgets, the budget define 
how much it is possible to spend and sets limitation for what is possible (Telgen, et al., 2007, 
p. 17). We expect the public to make the economical best choices, but we also want them at 
the same time to be beneficial to society and an instrument to drive innovation  (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007) and promote sustainability (Brammer and Walker, 2011, p 1). The trouble 
is of course that achieving one of these often excludes one or more of the other. It is hard to 
imagine how to drive innovation and at the same time achieve the highest profit, as innovation 
is expensive and takes time (Jakobsen, 2012).  
In the first stages of the procurement process; sourcing and delivering goods, compliance with 
legislation, efficient use of funds and accountability acts in a similar manner as a private 
organisation. However public procurement is expected to focus on more than just cost vs. 
quality and an expectation for the product or service to have a larger contribution. It is not 
only expected to fulfil the goal of the procurement but also contribute to the overall goal for 
the public organisation as supporter of broader government policy objectives. They are not 
only expected to supply goods and services but also expected to be a supporter of change and 
reform, and contribute with policy goals such job creation and strengthening the industry 
(Telgen, et al., 2007, p. 21). 
Research within public procurement (Miranda & Kim, 2004, Scott, 95) has shown that public 
organisations often are more driven by formal law and social expectations, than what is the 
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case for private companies. This behaviour is a result of the need to secure legitimacy for the 
choices being made within the public. It has also been found that this need is so strong that it 
prevails the traditional transaction cost logic that organisations are driven by “comparative 
efficacy”.  Both political organisations and government agencies are expected to turn around 
fast and be positive when institutional pressure occurs, this helps explain why public 
procurement often is driven by legitimacy considerations (Miranda & Kim, 2006) and not 
transaction cost logic. To fully understand the reaction pattern of a public organisation, 
knowledge about institutional pressure is paramount. In Roar Jakobsens paper “Public sector 
contracting” from 2012, Jakobsen argues that an organization's formal structure is a result of 
the “institutional forces of rules and regulations, norms and social expectations and taken for 
granted knowledge” much more than functional needs such as resources and technology. The 
legitimacy is often achieved through following the rules and regulations. 
2.4 Stakeholders within public procurement 
Stakeholders are the participants affected by the choices of public procurement. It is useful to 
know who they are and where their interest lies within the decision making. There are two 
main groups: the government and outside public stakeholders.  
2.4.1 Governmental stakeholders 
The government is complex and has many layers, and conflicting interests. Government 
leaders will focus on having a system built on the legislation, to avoid any scandals. Their 
goal is to use the system to deliver services according to the needs of the government as 
flexible as possible. Politicians are also governmental stakeholders. Their interest can be more 
diversified. They can view public procurement as a “means to an end”, and events that can 
make them look good to their constituents. Often their focus can be on achieving short-term 
political goal. They are responsible for the approval of government funding and important 
groups with government stakeholders. If it benefits their case can work against approved 
procurement plans to fulfil their own short term goal. Other governmental employees work 
within different areas in the government and their interest will be in their own needs, many 
wanting a flexible procurement process, with room for them making the decisions they 
consider best. Governmental customers are the end users of the service or product procured. 
Their interest lies not with the overall goal of the procurement process, but focuses on having 
their needs met on time. For them a speedy process is the priority as this is what will deliver 
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the product or service they need faster. However this can differ depending on whom the 
stakeholders as governmental customers have different focuses (Schooner et al, 2008, p 17).  
2.4.2 Outside public stakeholders 
Outside public stakeholders doesn’t have a direct role in the process but still have an interest. 
The public is the largest group within this category. They have an interest for how the 
government spends their money. Within this group there are many diversified needs. However 
there is an overall expectancy for the government to spend their money wisely. There is an 
expectation for getting the most value for money and that the money isn’t misspend. 
The procurement system is expected to ensure integrity and safeguard against corruption. 
Public procurement has a high level of transparency, still not all decisions made are available 
to public and this may cause them question the government's decisions. When the public 
become users of the service their role as a stakeholder and interest can change (Schooner et al, 
2008, p 19). The Oversight Community holds the government accountable. It consists of the 
courts, the office of the Auditor General, interest groups and the media. The non-
governmental group and the media play an important role in supplying the public with 
information about conducted procurement processes. These groups can be motivated by 
different interests, however they all provide “information, evaluation and criticism of public 
procurement”, and transparency is considered to be one of their main concerns. (Schooner et 
al, 2008, p 20). Non-Government Oversight is a group consistent with third party observers 
that looks into the procurement process and watches out for corruption. They investigate and 
report various procurement and these reports are made available to the public. The media is 
also an important contributor within this group. Their role and interest in the procurement 
system can be one sided, focusing on corruption and misconduct. When they choose to 
highlight such matters it influences the public's view on how public procurement is conducted 
and this is a factor the government and policy makers should be mindful of. (Schooner et al, 
2008, p 21).  
The last group is the private stakeholders. This is the private companies that have a role as 
suppliers to the government or companies trying to enter into a contract. This group is 
motivated by profit. Being awarded a contract with the government is lucrative and secure.  It 
offers the supplier a long time commitment and be good for their reputation (Schooner et al, 
2008, p 22).  
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 2.6 Rules and regulations for Public procurement 
Public procurement is a complex system with conflicting goals. There are both procurement 
(quality, timeliness, cost, minimizing business, financial and technical risks, maximizing 
competition, and maintaining integrity) and non-procurement goals (preferring a local 
company, environmental goal and social goals such as the protections of minorities) to be 
considered in the process and these goals are often in conflict with one another. Finding the 
optimum relationship between these goals can be challenging. It is therefore important to have 
clear public regulations defining the organization's structure, role and responsibility. 
Regulations should be a roadmap for the whole procurement process, it is a good guideline for 
how public procurement should be conducted and it adds legitimacy and ensures a fair and 
equal treatment of suppliers, and offers the public reassurance that there is a diligent process 
(Thai, 2001, p 27-28) It is often assumed that it is easy to adopt the principles and theory from 
private procurement and adapt them in public procurement. To gain a better understanding, it 
can be useful to investigate what, if anything sets public procurement apart. To be able to 
achieve the best possible result, knowledge about the mechanism guiding the process is 
necessary in order to know which theories and methods to apply. Procurement within the 
private sector is much more driven by internal procedures, while public procurement is 
derived externally, by a ridgid set of rules and regulation.. In the private sector the goal is 
making a profit, the public sector expected to accomplish larger. There are many stakeholders, 
often with incompatible objectives related to economy, society, politics and innovation. We 
expect the public to make the economical best choices, but we also want them at the same 
time to be; (1) beneficial to society, (2) an instrument to drive innovation  (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007) and promoting sustainability (Brammer and Walker, 2011). The trouble is 
of course that achieving one of these often excludes one or more of the other. It is hard to 
imagine how to drive innovation and at the same time achieve the highest profit, as innovation 
is expensive and takes time (Jakobsen, 2012). Law embodies public procurement regulation. 
The Norwegian legislation is influenced by our agreement with the European Union through 
the EEA agreement. The rules and regulation for public procurement, within the EU are 
guided by article 65 and the main principles are: (1) non-discrimination (2) equal treatment 
(3) Transparency (4) Proportionality (5) mutual recognition and (6) competition. The same 
principles for the Norwegian legislation are: (1) Promote efficient use of resources (2) 
Contribute to integrity in behaviour with public organisations, to ensure trust in the public that 
public procurement is conducted in a manner that is in community service (3) Ensure efficient 
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use of community resources (4) Efficient competition in the market (5) Enhance integration 
and trade, also giving access to supplier from other EU/EEA countries (6) Equal Treatment 
and predictability (7) Prevent corruption and enhance the public's trust in government 
financial management and (8) Professionalism and standardisation 
  
The principles of transparency, equal treatment and open competition is designed to ensure an 
European cross country market, meant to increase competition, gain better offers and ensure 
the government to be perceived as a professional counterpart. Critics have argued that even 
though having a highly regulated public procurement system does encourage open 
competition, reduce corruption and reduce improper use of taxpayers money, it is not without 
a cost (Torvatn & de Boer, 2017, ). An “open competition” also initiates a requirement for 
highly detailed regulations, and this again will erode getting “value for money”. In order to 
gain openness and transparency, transaction cost will rise. When the main focus is on an open 
competition, more than achieving the best offer, transaction cost is expected to rise 
(Domberger & Jensen, 1997, p 69). To address these issues, both the Norwegian and 
European legislation was updated in 2015/2016, with the goal of simplification, social 
responsibility and regulations with room for flexibility (Saussier & Tirole, 2015, p 1).  In the 
guidance for public procurement, published by Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, the term 
“the most economical adventurous offer” is said to be an overall criteria for contract award 
(Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2017, p 202). This term is not a part of the Norwegian 
legislation but should be seen as a basis for the three alternatives for contract award: (1) 
lowest price (2) lowest total cost and (3) best relationship between price/lifecycle cost and 
quality. The most common method used within the European Union and for large complex 
procurements is the method that is a combination of price and quality. (Lundberg. S & 
Bergman, M, 2011, p 2). Working within public procurement has the possibility to be a 
challenging environment due to strict procurement legislation. It is one of the most sensitive 
areas of government, there can be political interferences, which can be legal and illegal and 
the suppliers who is not awarded the contract will most likely be displeased and users can 
dislike the fact the procurement now is centralised and that they have little influence over the 
process in a now ridged system (Thai, 2004, p 1). 
2.6.1 Procurement procedures 
Reducing public spending has been a focus area both in Norway and within the EU, and one 
of the changes that were made was allowing a more lenient process. The regulation of public 
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procurement guided by threshold values, which defines which part of the law is applicable to 
use. This is regulated in chapter two of Law of public procurement. Part I is applicable for all 
procurement equal or above 100 000 MNOK, part I og II regulates procurement below EEA-
threshold value and special services and part I og III is for procurement where the estimated 
value of the service exceeds (1,3) 2 mill ex mva and 44 mill - construction (EEA regulation). 
As this paper addresses large procurements, it will only focus on the procedures defined in 
part III. Chapter 13 regulates procurement procedures for procurement over the EEA 
threshold values in law of public procurement.  It´s stated that the principal always has the 
choice of an open or restricted bidding competition (§ 13 - 1). An open competition allows all 
qualified suppliers to submit offers, a limited bidding competition is only open for those 
suppliers invited to participate by the principal. If applicable terms are fulfilled the following 
procedures are also available: competition with negotiations after prior announcement, 
competitive dialog, and competition with innovative partnership, competition with 
negotiations without prior announcement, procurement without competition. All the cases 
examined in this paper are competition with negotiation, this is the only procedure that will be 
elaborated.  
  
2.6.2 Competition with negotiations 
Competition with negotiation allows for negotiation of all parts of the tender and is regulated 
in § 23-7. Suppliers have to request participation and fulfil defined pre-qualification 
requirements. It is possible to only choose a limited amount of suppliers to submit offers. 
Negotiations with suppliers are allowed after they have submitted their offers. This applicable 
when the terms for §13 - 2 and 13-3 of the procurement regulation is fulfilled and for 
procurements above EEA threshold values. There are no strict terms in order for the principal 
to use this procedure and it is meant to be a useful tool all, particularly for procurement 
concerning design or innovation, or for large complex procurements and should not be used 
for procurement of standard products available in the market. It is conducted as a two-step 
procedure. It starts off with a prequalification open for all interested suppliers, then suppliers 
who fulfil the principal’s requirements will be invited to submit offers. As long as a minimum 
of three suppliers are invited to submit an offer it is possible for the principal to limit the 
number of suppliers invited. It is also common to conduct a prequalification seminar for 
suppliers. As long as the chosen method is described in the tender documents, the principal is 
free to decide how to conduct the negotiation process. It can be conducted in several phases, 
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each phase may reduce the numbers of suppliers participating in the competition. All 
evaluation should be conducted on the basis of award criteria. The main purpose of the 
negotiation is to reach the best possible offers and as long as the negotiation should not 
include any changes to significant deviations, changes or absolute minimum requirements. 
The principal should offer the supplier’s feedback on their submitted offers and offer 
guidance on how to improve them. Information that is related to the supplier's chance of 
winning the contract should be addressed but the principal is not obliged to inform the 
supplier of any negative factors in their offer. This information should be conducted without 
giving out any information about the other received offers. (Difi, 2019) 
  
2.7 Evaluation models 
The most common models for evaluation are (Difi, 2019): 
1.  Evaluation based on the lowest price were price is the only criteria or evaluation based 
on the lowest total cost - this also consider life cycle cost 
2.  Evaluation based only on quality (fixed price) 
3.  Relative score models evaluation based on a combination of the lowest price / total 
cost and the best quality, based on predefined criteria made available to suppliers in 
tender documents. 
4.  Pricing of quality as an evaluation method 
  
When deciding on an evaluation model one should strive to use a model as simple as possible, 
and it is recommended that the model chosen is well known within the procurement team. 
There are no rules and regulations guiding what model that has to be used. One should 
consider the expected price spread and the expectations and the actual pricing should be an 
important factor of influence in which model is chosen.  
Quality should always be awarded maximum score for the best offer for each evaluation 
criteria to maintain the accurate price vs. quality weight. The choice of model has the ability 
to affect the outcome of the competition, one should therefore consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of the models. The most common method within the European Union, and for 
large procurements, is an evaluation model with price and quality, called relative score 
models. When both price and quality is part of the evaluation it becomes more complex 
(Lundberg & Bergman, 2011,  p 2). As this paper is about public procurements that are a mix 
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of both price and quality we will only examine the theory for relative score models and 
pricing of quality as an evaluation method. 
  
2.7.1 Relative score models 
A relative score model assesses the price/cost and the qualitative criteria in relation to each 
other and not against predetermined criteria. All criteria are assessed from a scale where the 
weights between criteria are taken into consideration. The most common models are based on 
the lowest price giving maximum score and the points for the other offer are assessed against 
the lowest price offer. A challenge within these methods is recalculation of price into points 
and awarding qualitative criteria points, and then uniting them in a common system.  
  
Linear method 
The linear method is the difference in scoring reflected by the percentage difference in price. 
The starting point is the lowest offer, which is given top score, and then the scoring for the 
other offer is calculated with the formula: 
 Total Score Offer X = 10 - 10x(Price Offer X- Price lowest offer)/ Price Offer X  (Difi, 2019) 
This model is not recommended for offers with an expected large price spread, for offers with 
more than 100 percent over the lowest offer it will give a negative scoring, which is deemed 
illegal according to KOFA 2007/131 (Utviklings- og kompetanseetaten, Oslo Municipality, p 
8). 
Proportional method 
This method distinguishes well between offers with similar price range, however the model is 
not well suited for large price differences between the highest and lowest offer. It is calculated 
using the formula:  
Total Score Offer X = Max Score * (Price for the lowest offer / Price offer X) 
The difference in scoring will be less the higher the price difference is.  (Difi, 2019) 
(Utviklings- og kompetanseetaten, Oslo Municipality, p 8). 
  
  
2.8 Award criteria  
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To ensure that the suppliers who submit offers are qualified to perform the services needed, a 
pre qualification phase is conducted. Suppliers have to apply with mandatory criteria, to 
safeguard against suppliers not being qualified to end up having the winning bid. These are 
mandatory criteria meaning that suppliers either comply with them or they are not allowed to 
submit an offer (Difi 2016). As long as these criteria are proportional to the procurement, and 
not discriminating suppliers based on location or nationality, the Principal is free to set these 
requirements as they see fit, cf. § 16-1, second paragraph  (Anskaffelsesloven,). 
Award criteria are a tool to ensure the offer covers the important items of the competition. It 
is regulated by Regulation for Public Procurement chapter 18, and the guideline is that the 
criteria should measure what adds value to the procurement, either technical or financially. 
They should be designed to ensure product deliverance according to the strategy for the 
procurement and it is important that they are measurable. The award criteria may not be 
discretionary in such a way that they allow the principal unlimited freedom of choice 
(regulation for public procurement §18-4) and can be focused around price or non-price 
related criteria, or a combination of both. Price, quality, capacity, competence and experience, 
implementation capacity, environmental properties, service conditions, plan for 
implementation and understanding of the assignment are examples of what can be chosen to 
be award criteria . It is not a goal to have as many criteria as possible, often it is easier to 
measure what is most important having only a few and focusing on the main (risk) areas. 
(Hansen, Kjell, 2019) 
  
2.8.1 Weighting of award criteria and scoring rules 
An evaluation that consists of both price and quality has to assign each of them a weight to 
establish the importance. Price and quality is evaluated separately, and then merged according 
to the given weight. The weight of each criteria, is a signal to the market, on the importance 
of each criteria. (Difi, 2019)  
 
2.8.2 Scoring rules and the use of scale for award criteria 
A scoring rule can be seen as a way to identify how well suited a supplier is to fulfil the need 
for the procurement in the evaluation (Lundberg & Bergman, 2011, p 3) and should be 
designed as a reflection of the preferences and needs of the principal. For evaluation of price, 
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total cost and quality, it is recommended to use an evaluation model that gives a score for 
each award criteria and multiplies it with the relative weight of the criteria.  
  
A scale from one to six or one to ten should be applied. The scale should be substantial 
enough for the scoring to be a reflection of actual differences offered. Each score is then 
summarised and the offer with the highest score is the winner of the competition. A scale who 
is independent of the assigned weight, makes it easier for the differences in the offers to be 
reflected. (Vekting og bruk av poengskala | Anskaffelser.no, 2018) (Utviklings- og 
kompetanseetaten, Oslo Municipality, p 6).  
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Chapter 3  Methodology  
 3.1 Research method 
The first and most important step in order to conduct successful research is deciding the 
research method and develop a plan for how to conduct it.  The first step is deciding on 
research design. The research design can be seen as the overall strategy for the research.  A 
good plan on how to perform the empiric research is necessary, and one should choose a 
design that enables the researcher to find the wanted information within the given constraints 
(Ghauri, P & Grønhaug, K, 2010, p 54).  Make sure it addresses logical problems and not 
logistical. In order to be able to describe the research question you want to solve, you need to 
choose a method and research design that enables you to answer what you seek to describe.  
Make sure the research question has substance, and remember that the way the research 
question is asked can help guide towards the most applicable research method. Depending on 
the question the researcher wants to explore there are different methods available. To explore 
questions such as how and why a case study is recommended (Yin, R, p 9). For this paper 
case study was chosen.  Case study as a method gives insight about a given subject, and 
allows exploration of key characteristics, meanings and implications. It gives the researcher a 
real life perspective on the phenomena  (Yin, R, 2014, p 4). Yin defines case study as “ a way 
of investigating an empirical topic by following a set of desired procedures” (Yin, R, 2014, p 
23) The method can allow for in depth investigation of a case  (Yin, R, 2014, p 16) and make 
it possible to investigate more variables than just data points and is reliant on multiple sources 
of evidence. It can be conducted for one single case or multiple cases and it has to include 
empirical data. Empirical data can be either qualitative, quantitative or both within case 
studies. (Yin, R, 2014, p 19). Case study as a method is not without concerns. It has been 
questioned if this method is really diligent? A systematic procedure should be followed and if 
the researcher is not aware of this, or if he allows vague evidence to affect the findings and 
conclusions, this will weaken the findings of the research and should therefore be avoided. 
The reason this is a higher concern within case studies, is due to the fact procedures for how 
to conduct a case study seem to be less available than for other methods, who have more 
specific procedures. Another concern about case studies is that some have mistaken case 
study research with studies conducted for learning and not purely research. The difference 
between the two is not always clear.  
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3.2  Interview 
Interview is a much used method to gain insight within case studies (Yin, R, 2014, p 110). 
The interview can be structured in different ways, and should be designed to best suit your 
research study. It can be an effective way for data collection and the purpose is to get 
information that will further the research (Ghauri, P, Grønnhaug, K, 2010, p 125). 
The most important factor to gain insight and be able to conduct a good case study, is to ask 
good and relevant questions. When conducting data collection, and examining the facts, new 
questions are likely to arise (Yin, R, 2014, p 73). A key element in designing good questions 
is to remember that researching is about the questions just as much as about the answer.  A 
good tip is to have a protocol where you can write down questions that arise during data 
collection, and use this as a place to raise questions and list likely data sources during your 
case study (Yin, 2014, p 90). This protocol can be a good tool for developing the questions 
and the interview guide. The interviews can be conducted by mail, by phone or in person 
(Ghauri, P, Grønnhaug, K, 2010, p 125). For a successful interview the researcher should 
preferably have knowledge about the responded, such as background, values and 
expectations. The interview can be conducted as a structured or unstructured interview.  
 
A structured interview has a predetermined standard format. All questions are set in advance, 
there is a fixed format and systematic sampling of information. They are often combined with 
quantitative measures and statistical methods. An advantage with this method, is that all the 
respondents get the same questions which makes it easier to compare the answers. It is also 
possible to send the questions to the responder in advance allowing time to reflect before 
answering. For some types of question it can also disadvantage, taking away the immediate 
response, and allowing time for the responder to consider what is answered.  
 
An unstructured interview is conducted in a freer manner. The free form of this kind of 
interview, allows for it to appear more as a form of conversation. There might be some key 
words for the interview prepared in advance on what topic to cover, but often the questions 
come up as the conversation flows and opens up for discussion, follow up questions, the 
possibility to discuss reactions and opinions of the responder. It allows for more in depth 
conversations and a greater possibility to explore the respondents knowledge as new questions 
arise as the conversation flows. It allows for more sharing of knowledge but also personal 
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opinions and the researcher has to be mindful of this and ensure to remain objective Ghauri, 
P, Grønnhaug, K, 2010, p 126).  
  
3.3 Research method for this paper  
I knew early on I wanted to gain in depth knowledge about large public procurement 
competitions and felt a case study would be the best way to achieve more knowledge about 
how they are conducted and what influences them. The data collection started with reading 
available documents online at Luftfartsverket.no and Jernbaneverket.no. Much of the strategy 
process conducted in advance and the tender documents can be found there. I also contacted 
the project managers for each project for the information that wasn't available to trace online 
and to ask them if they would be available for an interview later on. As this research is partly 
about the relationship between price and quality it would have been interesting to be able to 
investigate the evaluation models. This was not possible as all the cases had classified them as 
internal documents.  They all responded positive to my request for an interview, pending they 
had time. This made me consider what kind of interview I should conduct. Preferably I would 
have liked to do a face-to-face interview or at least one over the phone, to allow for 
conversation and the possibility to ask follow up questions. However due to distance and to 
ensure there would be time for the respondent to answer, I decided to conduct an interview by 
mail. To prepare for the interview I read all the strategy documents for each procurement, 
tender documents and the award documents. I also read complaints from suppliers and the 
principals answer, which offered a lot of insight. Part of what I wanted to explore was why a 
low price seemed to be more important than quality, even when quality was said to be the 
determining factor. During my reading I wrote down all the information that I wanted to 
explore further about each case, and I used this information to develop an interview guide. 
This interview guide ended up being quite extensive. To make sure the questions I asked were 
relevant and understandable, I asked acquaintances working within procurement to do a read 
through and comment. It made it clear that some of the questions were redundant and it 
removed any uncertainty for the questions being asked. The questions were conducted in 
Norwegian, since it is our common language. The answers have been translated to be included 
in this paper. The findings in my research made me want to explore a second research 
question: why do we have different expectations for public procurement and how are these 
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expectations influenced? To explore this question I used applicable theory about stakeholders 
for public procurement and connected this theory with the public dialog for all three cases. 
  
3.4 Sources of error 
For all research it is important to be aware of sources of error that might affect the outcome of 
the research.  
 
This case study is only conducted on the basis of three cases, preferable there should have 
been more. Originally there were two more cases that I wanted to include, but it was not 
possible to get a positive response about the necessary documents. The time available 
prevented the findings of other applicable cases. In order to explore the relationship between 
price and quality at a more statistical level, it would have been useful to conduct a 
quantitative analysis to explore the difference in the use of procurement procedure and if this 
influences the scoring for quality. That would have added to the quality of this paper, and is 
something I recommend for further research.  
 
Interview as a method offers a number of possible weaknesses. The questions asked may not 
be good enough, or can be misunderstood by the respondent. All of the interviews were 
conducted via email, which prevents any personal connection with the respondent. Yin 
recommends having a good knowledge about the respondents before conducting the interview 
which was not the case in this study.  
Conducting a written interview by email can prevent the respondent to answer spontaneously 
and can be a source of error. All the questions were however of a more general character, to 
avoid any feeling of bias, so I don't consider this to be an issue for this paper. A structured 
interview by email will not allow for the free conversation of an unsystematic interview and it 
may prevent the amount of information received. However all the received answers were 





Chapter 4   The Cases  
All information in the case review is retrieved from the tender documents or the award letters 
unless stated otherwise  
4.1 Procurement of Ambulance Helicopter Services  
4.1.1 Introduction 
The first case was the procurement of Ambulance helicopter services for all of Norway, for 
the period 1. juni 2018 – 31.mai 2024. The value of the procurement was estimated to 410 
million NOK but the final cost for the contract was 500 million NOK, an increase of 100 
million NOK from the previous contract period. Two suppliers held the previous contract. 
The procurement was conducted as a competition with negotiation. Qualified suppliers were 
invited to submit offers and the best offers participated in negotiations. The scope of the 
procurement was a total operation of all air ambulance bases, including the procurement of 
and operation of ambulance helicopters and a medical car. The national ambulance service 
consists of 13 ambulance helicopters stationed at 12 bases, in addition to nine ambulance 
airplanes stationed at seven bases and six rescue helicopters bases.  
 
The procurement process was divided into a pre qualification phase, a pre qualification 
conference for the qualified suppliers, submission of offers and then negotiations. The 
strategic goal for the procurement was to ensure a robustness of the service and that suppliers 
should plan staffing, to ensure a high readiness and preparedness. There were five suppliers 
taking part in this competition, but only four suppliers submitted an offer. Suppliers were 
offered to bid on 6 different regions. It was stated that each supplier would be awarded a 
minimum of two regions, and should submit their offers accordingly. They were also invited 
to make an offer of all 6 regions, defined as a 7th region. The principal had stated that they 
would prefer a solution with two suppliers, but only if the total cost of such a solution would 
not lead to more than 1 percent price increase. This solution also opened up for choosing the 





 4.1.2 Interview - How the weight for price and quality was determined 
This is a summary of the information received in the interview with the project manager for 
how the weights for price and quality was conducted. The interview was conducted in 
Norwegian and the answers have been translated into English for a coherent read of the 
paper. 
 
 The weights between price and quality, is a reflection of the award criteria. When the product 
or service is not complex, mandatory criteria can be enough to ensure a basic standard is 
fulfilled, and a high weight for quality criteria is not necessary. For more complex 
procurement, weight is important. It becomes more important to be able to assess the 
difference in the offered quality for each sub criteria, which helps the principal separate the 
good and less good product or services.  Quality is often given a higher weight when the 
procurement is complex and this was also the case for this procurement. The principal 
conducted the weight according to these principles. A calculation of the real weight for each 
criteria was conducted after the tender documents were finalised to ensure the balance was as 
desired.  
  
4.1.3 Evaluation  
Evaluation criteria were given the weight 40 percent for price and 60 percent for quality 60. It 
was stated that the economically most advantageous offer should be chosen from a total 
assessment based on the defined criteria for evaluation of price and quality. 
The evaluation of price was conducted based on fixed and variable pricing including: 
·    A set fee and technical hour rate multiplied with flighhourbases for each base together 
with backup helicopters 
·    Unit prices for additional crewmembers related to new ESA work and rest time 
regulations multiplied with crew bases 
·    For each base 
The proportionate method was used for calculation of the scoring. With this method the 
offer with the lowest total price was awarded 10 points. Points for the other offers was 
calculated according to this formula: 
 (sum best offer) / (sum best offer X) * 10 = Points for offer X 
The score was after recalculated into points with a weight of 40 percent.  
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The evaluation of quality was divided into:  
·    Mandatory criteria: minimum demands that had to be met for the offer to be considered - 
offers that did not meet those would be declined - there were 152 mandatory criteria 
·    Evaluation criteria where divided into EV1 and EV2 – criteria.  
  
The weight between the different sub criteria was: 
- Requirement for aircraft                                           25 percent 
- Requirement for progress                                        25 percent 
- Requirement for rescue technical                          7, 5 percent 
- Requirement for medic car                                       20 percent 
- Requirement for quality, readiness and competence   22, 5 percent 
 
Evaluation result for price: 
1. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer D  10  
2. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer B   9,92  
3. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer A   9,82  
4. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer C  9,66 
5. Lufttransport, Offer 1    8, 66 
6. Lufttransport, Offer 3    8,64 
7. Lufttransport, Offer 2    8,64 
 
Evaluation result for quality 
1. Lufttransport, Offer 3   10 
2. Lufttransport, Offer 2     9,97 
3. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer C   9,8 
4. Lufttransport, Offer 1    9,73 
5. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer B   9,72 
6. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer A   9,7 
7. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer D   9, 67 
Looking at the evaluation of price and quality next to each other it is interesting to see how 
the tables are practically reversed and according to basic procurement theory, that with better 
quality comes a higher price 
 
The final evaluation result based on the merge of price and quality was 
 Supplier   Total score Price 
1. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer B  9,8  NOK 3.054.947.078 
2. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer D 9,8  NOK 3.031.036.072 
3. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer A 9,75  NOK 3.087.777.203 
4. Norsk Luftambulanse, Offer C 9,74  NOK 3.136.976.893 
5. Lufttransport, Offer 3  9,46  NOK 3.508.777.203 
6. Lufttransport, Offer 2  9,44  NOK 3.508.923.961 
7. Lufttransport, Offer 1  9,3  NOK 3.499.958.756 
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 All the offers were given maximal or very close to maximal score in the evaluation of quality 
criteria. The scoring range was from 10 to the best offer to 9,67 with the lowest offer.  The 
difference in the scoring range for the offered price was from 10 to 8,67, which is a whole 
point more in difference. In monetary terms the lowest price was 3.054 million NOK and the 
highest was 3.508 million NOK.  
 
Analysing this procurement from a best value for money mind set, it is only logical to choose 
the offer with the lowest price. The difference in the offered quality from the first and last 
offer was 0,33 and the difference in the offered price was approximately 500 million NOK. It 
would make no sense from a responsible economical view to choose an offer who was that 
much more expensive to gain that little quality. 
 
The difference between the offer with the lowest price and the winning offer, was that the 
winning offer was for a new AW139 helicopter while the offer with the lowest price offered 
the same helicopter only used. This shows that the principal will choose the best quality as 
long as the cost ratio between the increased quality and price is reasonable. In the justification 
for the contract award it is said that the offers from Norsk Luftambulanse and Lufttransport 
were practically identical. “There were differences in the progress plan where the winning 
offer had a lesser solution and with the simulator solution where the winning offer offered a 
better solution. The large difference in the two offers was that the winning offer had a 
substantial lower price.” This is a good example of that when quality criteria gets awarded 




4.2 Procurement of Air ambulance aircraft  
4.2.1 Introduction 
The second case is the procurement for operation of ambulance flight services, for the period 
July 1, 2019 30.juni 2025. The value of the service was estimated to 2,2 billion NOK a year in 
the tender process and the total value at contract award was 2,6 billion NOK. Three different 
suppliers previously operated the contract. The procurement was conducted as a competition 
with negotiations with contract award for one supplier. The scope for the new contract was a 
complete operation of all air ambulance aircraft at relevant bases, including acquisition and 
operation of ambulance aircraft, staffing, maintenance, emergency preparedness, equipment, 
training etc. The national air ambulance consists of nine ambulance aircraft at seven bases, in 
addition to 13 ambulance helicopters on standby at 12 bases, and sick rescue helicopter bases. 
The Strategic goal for the procurement was to ensure a robust manning of the service and 
reduce the time where the service is unavailable due to unforeseen personal matters.  
  
4.2.2 Interview - How the weight for price and quality determined 
This is a summary of the information received in the interview with the project manager for 
how the weights for price and quality was conducted. The interview was conducted in 
Norwegian and the answers have been translated into English for a coherent read of the 
paper. 
 
There are several important factors determining the weight between price and quality 
for procurement. It will be dependent on the overall strategy and goal for the 
procurement. How important is a high quality for the product or services. Market 
considerations such as the difference in the quality offered by suppliers. In a market 
where suppliers traditionally offer similar quality, quality becomes less important, and 
increasingly important if suppliers usually offer services with larger differences. 
Another important factor to consider is the monetary value of the quantitative 
difference in quality.  How easy is the offered quality transferred from paper to reality, 
it can be challenging to measure subjective quality such as work experience and 
quality of their work. Even if a person has a lot of experience on paper it is not a 
guarantee for a good deliverance of quality. The mandatory criteria is an important 
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safeguard to ensure high quality, in fact it is possible to have an evaluation purely 
based on price, and still have quality as the most important factor, covered by 
mandatory criteria. For this procurement all this factors played a part in deciding the 
weight between price and quality, however top management made the final decision. 
For this evaluation and comprehensive mathematical model was developed, taking 
into account the weight including the sub criteria. To test the model a simulation was 
conducted. It is difficult to predict how the difference in price and quality offered from 
suppliers will be in advance, but a simulation offers a better basis for the evaluation. 
 
4.2.3 Evaluation 
This resulted in evaluation criteria with a 40 percent weight for price and 60 percent weight 
for quality. The economically most advantageous offer was to be chosen from a total 
assessment based on the defined criteria for evaluation of price and quality. 
  
Price was evaluated using the supplier's fixed and firm prices, inclusive 
-a fixed remuneration, technical price per hour multiplied with flight hours per base as well as 
for reserve aircraft (according to attachment B - price form). The evaluation was conducted 
according to the proportionate method. The offer with the lowest total sum for price is given 
the score of 10. Points for the other offers are calculated using the following formula: 
(Sum best offer) / (Sum offer X)*10 = Points for offer X 
and then the score was recalculated into points with a weight of 40 percent. 
 
The evaluation criteria for quality was a total of 367 requirements divided into: 
Mandatory criteria: minimum demands that had to be met for the offer to be considered - 
offers that did not meet those would be declined 
·    Evaluation criteria where divided into EV1 and EV2- criteria. The offer that best 
fulfilled the evaluation criteria was awarded the highest score, and there were 95 
evaluation criteria. 
·    Contract criteria: criteria to be fulfilled by the supplier throughout the contract 
period. 
·    Documentation of requirement: criteria the supplier needed to document was 
fulfilled. 
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272 criteria were either mandatory criteria or contract criteria  
The weight between the sub criteria segment was: 
- Requirement for aircraft, approvals, and flight coordination           27,5 percent 
- Requirement for progress                                                                20 percent       
- Requirement for medical furnishings                                               25 percent 
- Requirement for quality and competence                                        20 percent       
- Requirement for readiness                                                            7,5 percent 
  
Evaluation result for price 
1. Babcock, Offer 1  10 
2. Babcock, Offer 2   9,62 
3. Lufttransport, Offer A  9,01 
4. Lufttransport, Offer B  8,99 
 
Evaluation result for quality  
1. Lufttransport, Offer A  10 
2. Lufttransport, Offer B  9,94 
3. Babcock, Offer 2   9,64 
4. Babcock, Offer 1   9,51
Also for this case the evaluation of price and quality show an almost complete reversal when 
price and quality is evaluated.  
  
The final evaluation result based on the merge of price and quality was 
 Supplier   Total score Price 
1. Babcock, Offer 1   9,7  NOK 2.584.048.652 
2. Babcock, Offer 2   9,63  NOK 2.685.392.497 
3. Lufttransport, Offer A  9,6  NOK 2.868.130.887 
4. Lufttransport, Offer B  9,56  NOK 2.874.027.782 
 
Also in this case suppliers got high scoring for almost all their evaluation criteria for quality, 
the difference between the highest score (10 points) and the smallest score (9,51) is only 0,49 
points. There were some differences in the type of aircraft offered, but in total this was said to 
be of little difference. Babcock had the highest score for the category 1 airplane medical 
furnishing, requirements for the aircraft in category 2 and approvals. For competence both 
suppliers got the same score. For all other categories Lufttransport was awarded the highest 
score.  For readiness Babcock got the lowest score, particularly for their winning offer (offer 
1) as this offer have a lower number of pilots in rotation and less back up aircrafts. The 
difference in price between the lowest and highest offer is approximately 300 million NOK, 
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with the best offer from Lufttransport being 11 percent higher than the winning offer, in 
monetary terms equal to million NOK per year. The estimated cost for this procurement was   
estimated to be 450,9 million NOK, however the received offers were substantially higher, 
and the yearly cost for the new contract was 500 million NOK a year. This was a 25 percent 
increase from the previous contract. Due to the increased cost it was looked into if it was 
possible to cancel the competition. The differences in offered quality are as shown, less than 
the differences in the offered price, indicating that when the more similar the offered quality 
is, the more important price is. However it can be argued that even if it is price that is the 
determining factor it is not quite so simple. There are mandatory requirements to be fulfilled 
that ensure the level of quality being delivered, and also to be a part of the competition the 
suppliers has to offer high quality in order for them all to receive almost maximal scoring, 
meaning that even if it can seem as price is the determining factor, it does not take away from 




4.3 Procurement of “Trafikkpakke 1 - Sør”  
4.3.1 Introduction 
The third case is the procurement for operation of the Norwegian railroad, for the area defined 
as “Trafikk Pakke 1”. This service was previously a monopoly conducted by NSB on behalf 
of Jernbaneverket. Previous to this competition the cost for running the operation of the 
railroad was 468 million NOK per year, with the new contract the new price is estimated to be 
150 million NOK per year, which is a substantial theoretical cost saving from the introduction 
of ex-ante competition. The procurement was conducted as a competition with negotiations 
and contract award will be for one supplier. This is the first time this service is subject for 
competition, the operation of the Norwegian railroad has been a government run monopoly. 
The scope for the competition is the operation of the railroad for the area “Trafikkpakke 1 
Sør”. It gives the supplier an exclusive right (monopoly) to operate the public railroad for 
personnel transport. The Strategic goal for the procurement was to increase the public train 
service and contribute to the zero aim pollution targets for car traffic, particularly around the 
large cities. Another goal for the competition was to contribute to more satisfied customers 
and ensure the government got more back for their resources spent on train services.  The 
most important goal was to contribute to an increased use of the railroad, to ensure an 
increase in travellers and their satisfaction. The stated overall goal for “Trafikkpakken” was: 
“The government will through competitive tendering of Trafikkpakken contribute to an 
increase in customers and customer satisfaction through selecting the operator that delivers 
the most customer friendly and cost efficient offer.”  
4.3.2 Interview - How the weight for price and quality determined 
To determine how the weight between price and quality was determined, I conducted an email 
interview with the procurements project manager. Part of the interview will be reproduced in 
Norwegian to ensure transparency and accuracy, the rest is translated to ensure a coherent 
read. 
 “Jeg vil med tanke på Trafikkpakke 1 omformulere litt og si … vurderinger som ble gjort før 
valg av vektingen …” according to the railroad reform a balance weight between price and 
quality was important, and at the same time is was important to send a signal to the market 
that quality was an important factor and that it would not be price alone that would determine 
who won the competition. However one of the motive behind the railroad reform and as stated 
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in tender documents was for the government to “ få mer for den ressursinnsatsen som ble lagt 
ned i pakken. “ This was the reasoning when deciding on the weight between price and 
quality for this procurement.  
  
Different evaluation model were tested prior to the decision. However in an evaluation 
applying a linear model, where the best offer for each criteria is awarded a score of 10 and the 
lowest will get 0, one supplier can get a collectively better score with the help of sub criteria 
and win the competition on that basis. 
  
4.3.3 Evaluation 
For evaluation criteria price was said to have 40 percent weight, and quality was to count 60 
percent. It was stated that the economically most advantageous offer was to be chosen from a 
total assessment based on the defined criteria for evaluation of price and quality.  
  
Evaluation - price: For the evaluation of price, the price was calculated from the offered 
fixed remuneration for all seven and half years plus the one plus one year option,  plus the 
sum of hourly prices for other assignments= Total offered fixed remuneration for 
Trafikkpakke 1 (2019 - 2028) + (sum of all hourly prices from appendix B - 1 point 2) 
A basis linear model was used to range the other offers. The offer with the lowest price was 
given 10 points before taking the weight for price (40 percent) into account. Any offer that 
was 100 percent higher than the lowest offer was given the score 0.                        
The Model for calculating price points was  
= 10 - (10 x (price offered - lowest price offered) /(lowest price offered)) 
The winning offer was for 150 million NOK a year and it was 21 percent less than the next 
offer.  
 
The evaluation of price was not possible to retrieve from Jernbaneverket, however from 
media coverage it is known that the winning offer from Go-ahead was 150 million NOK, the 
offer from the second runner up NSB was 21 percent higher, which means is should have 
been 181,5 million NOK.  
 
For evaluation of quality there were 117 mandatory criteria for suppliers to fulfil. The 
mandatory criteria was to ensure customers the same quality as todays service (Hovland, 
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2018). Then there were 15 sub criteria suppliers was assessed by, and the criteria were 
divided into sub criteria assigned different weight: 
How will the supplier achieve satisfied customers (6 criteria)        40 percent 
How does the supplier manage the vehicle (3 criteria)                      5 percent 
Suppliers organisation and management (6 criteria)                        15 percent 
  
For the other cases the sub criteria were given a weight of 100 percent and then recalculated 
to the weight of 60 percent. For this case the weight for quality criteria was in total 60 
percent. 
  




3. SJ Norge 
Evaluation criteria - Quality  
(Slotsvik, K. L, 2018) 
1. SJ Norge 129,15 
2. NSB  126,70 
3. Go-Ahead 119,75 
 
It was not possible to retrieve any information about the scoring awarded for price from 
Jernbaneverket. This means that an analysis for the relationship between price and quality will 
be incomplete.  
 
NBS was awarded the highest score for 12 of 15 award criteria for quality, and Go-Ahead 
who was the winner only scored highest for one award criteria for quality. The winner of the 
competition was the supplier who of the three finalists had the lowest quality 
score  (Bentzrød, S.B, 2018). Kirsti Slotsvik in Jernbaneverket says that one of the reasons 
Go-Ahead won was because they estimated to recruit a higher number of passengers, and that 
in the end price was the deciding factor (Bentzrød, S. B., & Furuly, J., 2018, October 17). In 
the evaluation for these criteria the order was: 1. NSB – 9.2, 2. SJ Norge – 9,1 and 3. Go-
Ahead – 8,4 Bentzrød, S.B, 2018. These numbers leave room to question this statement.  
 
The statement of price being the deciding factor, does contradicts the previous 
communication from Jernbaneverket where Dagfinn Berge, Director of Passenger Traffic 
Agreements, stated, “it's not how far low the offered price is that should be the determining 
factor. “ In all fairness he did add that “Price should be weighted 40 percent, quality and 
considerations for employees 60 percent” (Bentzrød, 2017). However the way this was 
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communicated did leave an impression that for this competition a low price would not be 
determining, even if this was something impossible to promising, giving the weight of the 
competition was set to 60 – 40 percent, meaning that even if counted less, price is still an 
important factor in the competition.   
  
The theoretical cost savings for this competition is substantial. Previously Jernbaneverket had 
paid NSB 485 MNOK a year for their operation of the railroad. With their new agreement it is 
estimated that they will pay 150 NOK to Go-Ahead (Bentzrød, S. B., & Furuly, J., 2018, 
October 17). However the real savings in cost will only be able to be evaluated after the 
contract is finished. It is said publicly by Go-Ahead, and also stated in the contract that all 
employees will be offered work with the wages and working conditions they have today. This 
is also stated in the contract. (Contract between Jernbaneverket and Go-Ahead) (Bentzrød, S. 
B., & Furuly, J. 2018, October 17).  The potential saving for this service was made possible 
through the introduction of competition in the ex-ante stage. It was not only Go-Aheads offer 
that would result in savings, also NSB´s offer for 180 million NOK, was substantially lower 
than what the service is operated for today. It is important to remember that these savings still 
only are theoretical, and the real savings will not be visible before the contract is up and 




4.4 How the procurement procedure influences the 
relationship between price and quality  
The below questions and answers from project managers are not directly connected to each 
case, but are answered in general. The answers have been translated to English to ensure a 
coherent read, with some exceptions were it is reproduced in Norwegian for accuracy.  
4.4.1 Is the difference in scoring for less quality than price? 
When reading all available information for the different cases I noticed that the difference in 
score awarded for quality seemed less than the difference in the scoring for price. I wanted to 
get the project managers take on this, and if it was something they could relate to.  
 
In their answers all project managers answered that this was not uncommon. There could be 
different reasons for this:  
- In negotiations the principal is able to guide suppliers towards what he want. When all 
suppliers receive guidance, their offer will become more similar, particularly for quality.  
- When quality is reviewed on the basis of the written offers – the real challenges (and 
differences) with quality are often not detected before the contract starts.   
- Sometimes the difference in the offered quality from suppliers was less than expected and 
the offered price was the real difference.  
 
- Two of the project managers also said that in an evaluation it was important to use the 
whole to be able to distinguish the difference in offered quality.  
- The project managers stated that through negotiations the offered level of the offered 
quality, in addition to become similar, reaches a high level. This is very good and 
basically what you want to achieve through negotiations.  
- One of the project managers stated: “The difference in the scoring for quality becomes less 
because the principal is able to guide supplier towards the desired optimum. This is not 
possible to do in the same way for the price element. Price consist of the suppliers cost 
and profit, and the ability to cut cost and profit, is an internal consideration with the 




4.4.2 Did the procedure - competition with negotiation -  affect the difference 
in the offered quality to become more similar? 
In an answer from Jernbaneverket to a complaint from SJ Norge it was stated “i en 
anbudskonkurranse med forhandling vil forskjell på kvalitet gir mindre utslag på score”.  
Could this help explain why quality evidently seemed to be less important than price as the 
determining factor for contract award? Did the procedure - competition with negotiation 
affect the difference in the offered quality to become more similar? I included those questions 
as part of my interview to project manager for each of the cases.  
 
All of the project managers could relate to this and explained this with the possibility to guide 
suppliers toward the desired optimum in a negotiation. When each supplier is given the 
possibility to improve his or her offers through guidance from the principal the offered quality 
will become similar and harder to distinguish.  
 
Ja jeg kjenner meg igjen i dette. Det er slik at en kvalitet på en leveranse i en 
forhandlingssituasjon blir bedre. 
 
Det er ofte tilfelle og henger nok sammen med at oppdragsgiver i større grad veileder alle 
tilbyderne i forhandlingene gjennom hvilken kvalitet som ønskes og det er lettere for 
tilbyderne å forbedre sitt tilbud. Oppdragsgivers målsetning med forhandlingene er stort sett 
alltid å øke kvaliteten på alle tilbudene og redusere prisen på alle tilbudene. 
 
I innledende tilbud har ofte tilbyderen svart på en måte som gjør at det ikke kan gis full score 
på et krav. I forhandlingsmøtet har oppdragsgiver muligheten til å gjøre tilbyderen 
oppmerksom på dette, og de gis en ny sjanse til å oppfylle kravet bedre. Det øker 
sannsynligheten for at flere tilbydere oppnår lik score (full score) på flere evalueringskrav, og 





4.4.3 Why does price seem like the determining factor for a competition were 
quality is given the higher weight? 
Another common denominator for all cases was that price seemed to the determining factor 
for contract award, despite quality having a higher weight. This was one of the mail questions 
I wanted to explore for this paper, to see how price could end up being what decided the 
competition. 
 
- One project manager stated  “it is not uncommon that the difference in awarded score for 
quality is less than for price. In an evaluation, to ensure predictability, the award criteria 
for quality and price is divided into sub criteria weighted according to importance. Each 
criteria is evaluated and summarized to the total score. When the offered quality is similar, 
price will become the determining factor even when quality has a higher weight. “ 
 
“For å ivareta forutberegnelighet er alltid tildelingskriteriene kvalitet og pris 
operasjonalisert ytterligere, kvalitetskrav ofte i undervekting og evalueringskrav. 
Evalueringen gjøres på hvert krav og modellen hensyntar den oppsatte vektingen slik at 
summen av alle kravene gir en overordnet score. “ 
 
 
- Another stated that: When the offered quality is given very equal score and the difference 
in the offered price is substantial, price becomes the determining factor, even when 
quality has a higher weight in the competition. Many suppliers uses a strategy were they 
offer an “ok” or sufficient quality but offers a low price in order to enter the market. To 
safeguard against this and ensure that the quality offered is sufficient, for the deliverance, 
purchasers should use mandatory criteria to ensure that the offered quality is at a 
satisfactory level.   
 
Two of the project managers stated that the result of the evaluation is a mathematical 
calculation and can offer unexpected results. Even if these results are different than the 





Chapter 5 The relationship between price and 
quality  
The choice of procurement procedure gives different possibilities. When competition with 
negotiations is used as the procurement procedure, the principal is able to guide suppliers 
towards their wanted optimum, which in turn allows suppliers to improve their offers with a 
better understanding of what the principal wants. ((Dimitri, Piga, & Spagnolo, 2006, p 133) 
 Through the conducted interviews I discovered that the negotiation often can make the 
offered quality become more similar as all suppliers become close to or reaches the optimal 
quality for the offer. When one element of an evaluation is similar, suppliers need to stand out 
in the other areas to be selected.   
 
5.1 The Price element 
The element of price in a competition consists of several components. In the offered price, 
suppliers have incorporated different factors. It is dependant on the suppliers personnel cost 
(wages and pension), their operation cost and also how effective they are able to conduct their 
operation. If the offered price is dependent on the supplier conducting a purchase of goods it 
will be dependent on the purchasing power of the organisation. A large supplier can have the 
benefits of economies of scale and the ability to secure better deals with their suppliers, 
enabling them to offer a lower price than their competitors. Innovation and the ability to work 
smart is also an important factor for suppliers to reduce cost. (Project manager, Interview, 
2020) ((Dimitri et al.2006, p 146) It can also be influenced by if they have faith in their own 
ability to lower cost throughout the contract period. Some cost will be common for all 
suppliers and some are defined by the capability f their organisation. Wages can be seen as a 
common cost for all suppliers, but a supplier is free to negotiate with its employees if they are 
willing to reduce their salary in order to secure the contract. This can be something other 
suppliers haven’t thought about and set the supplier apart from the other. How suppliers 
calculate the cost of the can be dependant on how they estimate the complexity of the task 
(Dimitri et al.2006, p 14) 
 
Another important factor for the offered price is the profit. Suppliers compete for contract to 
earn money, and the suppliers willingness to reduce their profit influence the offered price. It 
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can be dependant on their willingness to take a risk, and also how much they want to enter the 
market. It is not uncommon for suppliers to offer a low price to enter the market. A public 
contract can offer the supplier long time stability and also a good reputation, which again can 
make it possible for the supplier to make more profit in other areas (Schooner et al, 2008, p 
22). 
 
All of these elements are dependent of the internal organisation of the supplier, and not 
something the principal can influence the same way through negotiations. Since this element 
is dependant on internal factors it is up to the supplier to decide what price they need in order 
to be able to conduct the assignment. The principal will want to achieve the best price 
possible, but at the same time they don’t want suppliers to offer a price that doesnt allow them 
to fulfil the contract. (Bruvoll, T, lecture, 2019) (Dimitri et al.2006, p 149). The term 
“winners curse” is when the price is so low the contract generates losses for the supplier 
awarded the contract (Dimitri et al.2006, p 149). 
 
Price becomes the deciding factor when the offered quality is similar. This does not 
automatically mean that quality is being sacrificed for a low price. In all three cases for this 
paper suppliers offered a high and similar quality. This allowed the principal the ability to 
choose the lowest price with an assurance that a good quality was secured. Quality was also 
ensured through the use of mandatory criteria that had to be fulfilled in order for the suppliers 
offers to be considered.  These requirements are a predefined minimum level of quality the 
supplier has to abide to. It is not possible to predict how an evaluation will turn out, and these 
requirements can be a way to safeguards and to ensure a sufficient predefined minimum of 
quality for the product or serve. The Ambulance Helicopter Services case had 152 mandatory 
criteria (Luftambulanse, 2015) , for the Air ambulance aircraft case were 272 (including 
contract criteria to be fulfilled during the contract) (Luftambulanse, 2016) . For Trafikkpakke 
1 - Sør mandatory criteria was specifically used to ensure the public would receive the same 
offer as they had today (Jernbaneverket, 2017).  
The difference in the offered price was for each case substantial, and for the total contract 
period the differences between the winning offer and the nearest competitor was:  
- 500 million NOK for the procurement of Ambulance Helicopter Services 
- 300 million NOK for the procurement of Air ambulance aircraft  
- 300 million NOK for Trafikkpakke 1 - Sør.  
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5.1.1  Complaints about low price 
For the procurement of “Air ambulance” and for “Trafikkpakke 1 – Sør”, there were 
complaints from the loosing suppliers that the price in the winning offer would not be enough 
to cover personnel cost related to wages and pension for the contract. A winning offer with a 
price that isn't viable can be a serious risk both for the principal and the supplier. A good 
example of this was the Veireno case for Oslo Municipality, in this case the supplier ended up 
being unable to supply the service and went bankrupt.  There are different ways the principal 
can safeguarding against this, pre qualification of suppliers is conducted to ensure that 
suppliers have a healthy financial situation and to ensure that they have knowledge and 
experience from the service or product in question. This was conducted for all cases in this 
paper. When suppliers have submitted an offer that is substantially lower than its competitors 
the principal has to investigate this and ensure the supplier is confident in their calculations. A 
meeting with the supplier in question should be conducted. If the supplier confirms the price 
is valid, the principal has the choice of rejecting, if is stated in the tender documents. The 
principal will have to show that the supplier will be unable to supply the service at the offered 
price, if not they can be responsible for damages. However it is important to remember that 
the goal of a procurement competition is to lower cost, and that competition can promote 
innovation. Suppliers are being encouraged to think outside the box, to identify new and 
smarter ways to supply the service. When pushing the boundaries of how things “always have 
been done” it is possible for suppliers to find new and smarter ways to organise their 
operation their competitors haven't thought of. Suppliers can also have chosen to lower their 
own profit in order to win the contract. This means that a price competitors think is to low, 
also can be a competitive advantage, and the introduction of a new and smarter way of 
working, that offers potential savings. It is important that the principal conduct a review of the 
suppliers calculations that offers assurance that they have a good understanding of the task at 
hand. If the supplier can offer the principal such reassurance, an abnormally low price does 
not need to offer a risk. Such a meeting was held with the suppliers for the procurement of Air 
ambulance aircraft and Trafikkpakke 1 – Sør. The complaints that these offer should have 






When the suppliers have had the chance to improve the quality in their offers, the difference 
between suppliers is often marginal. As the answers from procurement managers showed 
through guiding it is possible to receive a high quality from all suppliers. As a result there is 
little that distinguish the offered quality from the suppliers. The difference in the offered 
quality can be hard to detect when the evaluation is only conducted on written merits, and the 
challenges will often only be detected after the contract has started (Project Manager, 
Interview, 2020) 
 
The difference in the scoring between the suppliers awarded the contract and the nearest 
competitor was:  
- 0,28 for the procurement of Ambulance Helicopter Services 
- 0,36 for the the procurement of Air ambulance aircraft 
- 9, 4 for Trafikkpakke 1 – Sør (the highest ranked offer was given 129,15 and the winner 
119,75) 
 
All three cases received offers that was defined as a high score for quality. In the Ambulance 
Helicopter Services and Air ambulance aircraft case scoring was consistent between 9 and 10. 
The difference between the offered qualities from suppliers can be defined as marginal. There 
can be larger differences on item level, but as for the deliverance of quality as a whole the 
difference is marginal.  
 
For Trafikkpakke 1 – Sør, the scoring was in the range of 7 and 9. According Jernbaneverkets 
own definition, scoring between 9 and 10 is considered to be excellent (“svært godt”) and 
scoring between 7 and 8,9 as good (“meget godt”) (Berntzrød, 2018). There are critical voices 
that disagree with this evaluation of scoring for quality, and claim that the differences are 
substantial. It is hard to determine who is correct, if any. The criteria for this procurement are 
all of a more subjective nature for how the supplier plans to conduct the service, and are 





5.3 Ambulance Helicopter Services 
For the procurement of Ambulance Helicopter Services the difference in score for quality was 
0, 28 between the winning offer and the best offer from the competitor, while the difference in 
price was 500 million NOK. There is no logical reason to claim that quality was in any was 
sacrificed for this procurement. On the contrary the offer with the second best price was 
chosen, because it offered the use of new helicopters. This is an example of a trade-off 
between price and quality, conducted on the basis of getting the best value (Valletti et al, 2009 
p 295). The tender for this procurement an option that the contract could be awarded to more 
than one supplier, should the price difference be less than 1 percent. However the price 
difference of this option was 7 percent, which didn’t make this option possible. 
 
 
5.4 Air ambulance aircraft 
For Air ambulance aircraft procurement, the difference in score for quality between the 
winning offer from Babcock and the best offer from Lufttransport 0,36. The price difference 
for this was of 300 million NOK. It has been documented that most of this price difference 
was achieved through a reduction in wages for 13 million NOK and pension for 30 million 
NOK each year. Some has argued that it is immoral and wrong for the government to use 
wages and pension condition as a mean to cut cost, while others claim it is exactly this 
innovative thinking the competition was meant to promote (Fridstrøm, 2020). The debate of 
what is right and wrong is as always more about ideology, than facts. From a procurement 
view it would have made no sense to choose an offer that was substantially more expensive 
only to achieve a marginal increase in quality. Even if the government is expected to uphold 
certain standards, there is nothing preventing them to promote new ways for suppliers to cut 
cost. The second runner up in the competition, was also the supplier who previously held the 







5.5 Trafikkpakke 1 –Sør 
The procurement of Trafikkpakke 1 –Sør, is a bit different. There are larger differences in the 
offered quality. The total score for quality for SJ Norge was 129, 15, NSB was awarded 126,7 
and Go-Ahead got a score of 119,75. There are larger differences in the offered quality, and it 
can be argued, as many does, that the winning offer only had one criteria were they had the 
best score for quality. According to Jernbaneverkets own considerations a score between 7 
and 8,9 is considered to be very good and a score between 9 and 10 is considered excellent 
(Bentzrød, S. B., & Furuly, J., 2018, October 17). Go-Ahead consequently scored lower than 
its competitors in the quality evaluation, except for one criteria and the difference in total 
score for quality was 10 point is leaves more room for doubt that quality was sacrificed for a 
low price without this necessarily being a fact. The mandatory criteria for this procurement 
designed to ensure that passengers would as a minimum receive the same quality as they had, 
ensuring the offers to customer being satisfactory regardless of the chosen supplier 
(Jernbaneverket, 2017). In order for this contract to be a success for Go-Ahead, they will have 
to deliver. What suppliers offer in the evaluation criteria are binding, and will be measured 
thought the contract period. Go-Ahead is also dependant on attracting passengers to ensure 
their own revenue and to be in compliance with the contract. 
 
Also an evaluation is a mathematical calculation, were it is the best total offer that is chosen. 
There is less information available about the evaluation model and the calculations conducted, 
and some of the critic has been that the process isn’t transparent enough. It has also been 
claimed that this would have shown that the competition had been “ridged to favour the offer 
with the low price (Berntzrød, 2018). These claims are only speculations, and none of the 
suppliers have made a formal complaint of the process to KOFTA.  There were two 
determining factors for the winning offer, (1) the lowest price and (2) a higher stipulation of 
the number of passengers. If they succeed it can give higher revenue and secure a higher 
profit, despite having offered a lower price than their competitors. Suppliers confidence in 
their own ability can be a factor that gives incentive to lower the price in order to win the 
contract. If they manage to attract more customers their revenue can increase, which can make 
up for the cost reduction. Go-Ahead as a winner of the competition is reliant to offer an 
attractive service to keep and ensure an increase of customers, so they have little incentive, as 
some suppliers may have in different kinds of contracts, to lower the quality after contract 
award.  
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5.6 Summary  
According to procurement theory the offers with the highest score for quality are also the 
offers with the lowest score (i.e. the highest) for price (Valletti, Dini, & Pacini, 2009 p 295). 
For all three cases this holds true, in all three cases a contract award was given to the supplier 
with the lowest or second lowest price. This show that these competitions was in accordance 
with basic procurement theory, but also that an evaluation is a combination of the price and 
quality element and that it is the totally best offer that will be awarded the contract. 
 
Based on the theory for procurement, the fact that a good quality in itself is not enough to win 
a competition, is really not all that surprising. Taking into account that the guidelines for 
public procurement issued by the Norwegian government says that choosing the 
economically most advantageous offer should be applied as a guide for all evaluation it 
becomes even less surprising that price also has a large part in the evaluation. In all these 
cases the best total offer has been selected, with a balance between a good quality and the best 
price. The reason price becomes the determining factor, is not because quality is less 




Chapter 6 Expectations and influences for public 
procurement 
 6.1 Expectations to public procurement 
Why do the public get so upset when what is considered the best offer, with a mix of price 
and quality is chosen? Why does it not seem reasonable for the government to pick the offer 
that delivers the best combination of price and quality? One of the reasons might be our 
expectations, and that our expectations are guided by the public communication for the 
procurement. It might be that when it is communicated up front that this will not be about 
offering the lowest price, but the best quality, it creates an expectation that it will be the offer 
with the best quality that should be awarded the offer. However by doing so, in what might be 
an attempt to reduce the scepticism towards contracting out public services and make it seem 
more harmless.  
  
Public procurement is a part of public administration, and our demands and expectations to 
the level of services supplied by the government is increasing (Difi, 2019, p 13). Together 
with an increase in our expectations of what government services should be able to deliver, 
there has been a reduction in the economical room for manoeuvring and an exception of 
streamlining. Contracting out can be a way to save money and to inspire innovation through a 
new way of working that enables suppliers (either public or private) to cut costs. However it 
will not automatically solve the expectation from the public, for the level of services 
expected, and might be an explanation for the public communication of quality being the 
deciding factor for the purchase. Managers might see it as an important message to pass on 
that quality is important, as many can be sceptical to the process of contracting out and see it 
as a way to only cut cost.  
 
A public procurement competition can have many conflicting goals. The internal organisation 
has business goals with an expectation of cutting and service delivery, while the public have 
expectations to the level of service the public should be able to supply. Often the level of 
expectations the public has, is not possible due to insufficient funding. (Schooner et al, 2008, 
p 4). The expectations to a procurement are connected to the goals, meaning also the 
expectation to what should be achieved are conflicting.  
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 A study has shown people are biased in how they react to new information and that they 
react with emotions instead of logic, when presented with facts in an area they have strong 
feelings about (Westen, et al. 2006). This psychological fact help explain how our 
expectations are different and why other can see the same service as a success for some and a 
scandal.  
 
Looking at how politicians have viewed these cases we see a trend were the conservative 
politicians, within the government, has defended these competitions and the results and both 
the Minister of health and the minister of Transportation has stated that they have saved the 
government a lot of money, and that they consider them a success. Conservative politicians 
have been found to focus mostly on the economy i.e. getting the lowest offer and most value 
for money (Alsos K, Berge, Ø, Røed Steen, 2012, p 66) which is according with their 
statements for these cases. For all cases politicians from Arbeiderpartiet and Rødt has raised 
questions with the way the competition is conducted and the high focus on cutting cost and 
how it will affect the workers (Bentzrød, 2018) ((Piene, 2018)). This also correspond with 
the findings of research showing that left wing politicians focus mostly on wages and working 
conditions (Alsos K, Berge, Ø, Røed Steen, 2012, p 66) 
6.2 Stakeholders within public procurement 
The use of contracting out to get the advantages of ex-ante competition can be a sensitive 
issue. Within public procurement there are several stakeholders often with conflicting goals. 
Areas within human services and raise more emotions (Domberger,1997, p 165). The cases in 
this paper are for ambulance helicopter and ambulance airplane services are services related to 
both people’s health and safety.  These are sensible issues and there seem to be an expectation 
the government will deliver the best service possible, not necessarily the economically best 
service, this expectation is carried forward by a public debate driven by the media and 
different stakeholders with conflicting goals. In all three cases there were debates about the 
way the procurement process was conducted, from both external and internal participants. In a 
public debate, the different stakeholders can have various reasons for contributing, not related 
to the procurement itself.  The media want to sell newspapers, in addition to their social 
responsibility and expectancy of information to the public. This often results in a focus on 
what is gone wrong, and the controversial issues and less on what is good. It is the case with 
room for debate that gets coverage in the media, and it affects the way public procurement is 
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perceived. The alterteriarate motive of the stakeholders is often not mentioned and can leave 
an insufficient view of the situation. This affects the public and legislators' view of what is 
going on and how public procurement is conducted. The governmental official will defend the 
conducted process in their communication, the various other stakeholders within the 
government will have conflicting interests depending on their needs and this will affect their 
communication and opinions. Below, I will show how stakeholders communication for each 
case affects our view and expectations for the procurement. For the different comments there 
might be alternative motives and when possible these will be highlighted.  
 
6.3 How did expectation and different stakeholders 
influence how the results of the cases were perceived? 
6.3.1 Ambulance Helicopter Services   
The winner of the competition was Norsk Luftambulanse who also previously held nine out of 
twelve bases for this service. A contract award to a Norwegian supplier, who also already is 
supplying this service, seems to cause less hard feelings among the different stakeholders for 
the choice of supplier. However there were still issues, particularly related to changes in the 
new contract compared to the old. The difference from the old contract is that Norsk 
Luftambulanse took over the operation of the bases Tromsø, Brønnøysund and Ålesund. A 
shift in the chosen supplier seems to create controversy and feelings. In the previous operation 
the three bases had one more helicopter than needed for daily operation, which ensured that 
when a helicopter was out for maintenance or unable to operate for other reasons, a backup 
helicopter was available. For the new contract there were some changes, and for the 
Brønnøysund base and the backup helicopter for Tromsø, there would be a different 
helicopter type. Experienced paramedics in the North claim this helicopter is less capable and 
would weaken the readiness. They claim there will be a reduction in capacity, reach and speed 
and that for the teen to twelve weeks a year this is applicable in the North of Norway these 
differences can be critical. In the end they admit that the operation can be conducted but has 
to be done in a different way than normal (Pedersen, 2016). These governmental stakeholders 
concerns should be seen in relation to the upcoming defence plan to move their Bell 
helicopters from bases in North of Norway to the South (Hansen & Rostad, 2016). This is a 
good example of how stakeholders commenting can have a larger agenda, wanting to 
influence both the public and the legislators. In this case it can be seen as a push for the Bell 
 52 
helicopters to remain in the North of Norway and not be moved south. Politicians from 
Arbeiderpartiet have also criticised the decision of smaller helicopters as back up, and 
challenged the health minister to reverse this decision, which he declined, and stated that the 
collective readiness for air ambulance capacity for North Norway would be very good also 
after 2018 (Aldra, 2016). This is a good example of how different stakeholders use the media. 
The legislators from Arbeiderpartiet want to show their constituents in the north that they 
have their best interest at heart, and would fight for their readiness offer, better than the 
current government. The paramedics can have more than one reason for speaking out. They 
might not like the switch in supplier, or the fact that they for some periods of the year will 
have to change their working methods. It can also be to influence both the public and the 
legislators, to protect the helicopters stationed by the defence in the north. It is a good 
example, how stakeholders comment on, and uses public procurement to forward their 
agenda, more than it is a comment on the procurement itself. The paramedics even said that it 
made sense from an economical point of view and that this way of operation was possible, it 
was just not as good as the old one (Hansen & Rostad, 2016). When it comes to life and 
health, we all subconsciously prefer that the service offered is the best, from an overall socio-
economic consideration this might not be viable or what is best for the country as a whole. 
  
In in the tender documents for this procurement is was stated that a contract award for two 
suppliers would be preferable from a risk point of view and it opened up for choosing the 
second best offer to achieve this, as long as the total cost didn’t increase with more than 1 
percent (Luftambulansetjenesten. (2015). In the review of the offers this solution proved to be 
more than 7 percent higher than the best offer and was not possible. This resulted in a contract 
award for only one supplier, and also some changed premises for the operation. From a 
government management point of view this is a sensible choice. They have an expectance to 
apply within the rules and regulations, and to deliver the service within the budget. However 
for the paramedics who operate these bases, it means a change in their working conditions, 
they can feel less secure in their ability to get the job done, and they did not have a goal or 
expectation for any of this to happen. So while the managers consider their goals to be 
fulfilled, the end users can feel completely different. Their goal was maybe to have the best 
equipment available, or in this case their expectation was that their working conditions would 
not be altered. (Schooner et al, 2008, p 4). It is likely to assume that due to budget constrains 
it was not possible to chose more than one supplier and therefor the expectations of the 
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government end user, and maybe also part of the public was not possible to achieve (Hansen 
& Rostad, 2016.)  
 
6.3.2  Air ambulance aircraft  
After the contract was awarded, Frank Wilhelmsen, the managing director in Lufttransport, 
the company who lost the competition complained in the media that the competition was 
rigged. Claiming they had to give up confidential information about the cost related to wages 
that never should have been forwarded to the competitor. They also claimed that there should 
have been a condition of business transfer to ensure a fair competition (Larsen, 2018). It has 
been created a picture that a business transfer for this competition would be easy to 
implement. An assessment conducted by Wikborg Rein, raises legal concerns if a demand of 
business transfer have been implemented legally. In their consideration they found it could be 
a violation to the EEA provisions (Johannessen, 2018) One can only speculate why 
Wilhelmsen felt the need to go out with this information, however it can be a way to influence 
the opinion of legislators and the public. Many, myself included, might think of 
Luftambulanse as a public company, in reality they are not. There were no requests from the 
company prior to the competition about business transfer as part of the process, and the 
information shared about wages, was information the company had agreed could be shared 
with the other participants in the competition. Juell stated that the “competition was 
conducted according to the rules and regulation for public procurement and that the new 
ambulance flight service will be delivered on time, with increased quality, capacity and a 
more robust shift solution”. He also said “even if the new service was 100 million NOK 
above today's price, without a procurement competition it would have been even more 
expensive. Competition contributes to innovation in many areas, also within wage and 
working conditions, and to include a requirement for business transfer would exclude 
suppliers potential for using price and new solution as a competitive tool” (Juel, 2018). This is 
a good example of a government official, defending how the procurement is conducted, 
highlighting that it has been done according to applicable rules and regulations, the 
improvements and savings achieved through the competition. This is to secure the view in the 
public and with legislators that it has been conducted in the correct manner. Despite their 
public media complaints about the process, Lufttransport did not file a complaint to 
“Klageorganet for offentlige anskaffelser (KOFA). Babcock won the competition with a price 
that was 47 million NOK less than the competitor. Most of the savings was through lowering 
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wage and pension conditions, with 13 and 30 million NOK. This was criticized and said that it 
is wrong for the government to cut costs by reducing wages and pension terms (Nykvist, 
2018).  All the media attention created about this competition has left an impression with the 
public, and maybe also with legislators, that the offer who won the competition was selected 
purely on price. It is worth mentioning that the offer who won, was an offer with new 
airplanes compared to Lufttransport who offered used airplanes. One would expect that this 
would be considered a raise in the offered quality. Through the media coverage, largely 
contributed by government users of the service, such as Mads Gilbert, it has painted a picture 
of the new offer being a poorer offer risking the lives of the public users in the process. It is 
worth remembering that stakeholders can have their own agenda  
In the new contract the service has never had more resources at its disposal. The spending has 
been increased with 100 million NOK and there are now modern propeller aircraft and a jet 
available. These facts seem to have been overlooked in the public debate, and are an example 
of how the media can prefer to highlight the “scandal” to the improvements made (Fridstrøm, 
2020) 
 
6.3.3  “Trafikkpakke 1 - Sør”  
The introduction of competition within the Norwegian railroad has been controversial. It was 
the end of an area of a public monopoly, hat has raised a lot of feelings and opinions. Maybe 
it was to south these feelings, Jernbanedirektoratet communicated that this competition would 
be founded on quality and not offering the lowest price. Could this statement have been 
influential in pushing the public debate towards an understanding that quality would count as 
100 percent (Bentzrød, 2018) Horneland, the functioning director for passenger traffic 
agreements, made this comment, when asked how Go-Ahead could be awarded this contract 
when they had offered the lesser quality compared to their competitors in the competition. He 
also stated that “when there was little difference in the offered quality price becomes more 
important”. Horneland is defending the process that has been conducted as a government 
stakeholder is expected to do (Schooner et al, 2008, p 17). For this case the process has been 
attacked from several different stakeholders. The media has written several critical articles 
about the process, particularly Aftenposten (see reference list), the media has a role as a 
public informant (Schooner et al, 2008, p 19) but also an interest to sell newspaper. Focusing  
on controversy and by giving room to the critical voices, add to the perception that the 
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competition hasn´t been conducted according to applicable rules and regulations (Schooner et 
al, 2008, p 20-21). In one article they even went so far as claiming the competition was rigged 
(Bentzrød, 2019). Several politicians have also expressed their concern for the process, both 
in the media and through “spørretimen” at the parliament. This has mainly been politicians 
from Arbeiderpartiet, Rødt, Sv and SP who all can have an interest as being perceived as 
looking out for their constituents interest. They also have an ideological inclination to be 
sceptical towards the use of private suppliers (Schooner et al, 2008, p 17) (Alsos K, Berge, Ø, 
Røed Steen, 2012, p 66). The second runner up in the competition, SJ Norge submitted a 
complaint to Jernbaneverket for this competition. In their opinion the competition had not 
been according to the rules and regulations for public procurement (SJ Norge, 2018). In their 
complaint they stated the evaluation of quality was not conducted according to the 
requirement of predictability and questioned whether the evaluation is in compliance with the 
principles of equal treatment, predictability and verifiability in the Public Procurement Act 
(LOA § 4), claiming that no real negotiation was conducted and stated that the offer from Go-
Ahead, should have been rejected as an offer priced very low or tactically priced held up 
against performance (Go-Aheads offer was 21 percent less than the number two in the 
competition). Jernbaneverket rejected all claims. They pointed out that the offered quality 
becomes similar in a competition with negotiation, price is an award criteria and a low price a 
competitive advantage. (Slotsvik, K. L.) Sj Norge is a private stakeholder and can have 
different motives to complain to Jernbaneverket. Their motivation could be influenced by the 
knowledge of future tender competition, sway of public opinion, or legislators. The evaluation 
for this procurement did have a wider spread in the awarded scoring for quality criteria.  
The Minister of Transportation considers this competition to be a great success even before it 
has started. He has publicly announced that the introduction of competition within the railroad 
operation will allow the government to save billions (Nissen, 2019). His goal has been to end 
the monopoly of governmental railroad operation, contribute to innovation and cut cost. When 
we view his expectation of what he wanted the procurement to achieve from a theoretical 
view it is not hard to understand why he think it is a success. The union however, disagree 
with his assessment and claim that the introduction of competition will raise cost and allow 
for foreign companies to make a profit, money that could have been spent improving the 
pubic railroad system. They have other goal and a different focus than the current minister of 
Transportation. Their focus is job security and working conditions (Nissen, 2019) What the 
minister considers a success because the procurement on paper has resulted in massive 
savings the union and also politicians from socialistic parties claim this is a destruction of the 
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railroad. They consider this to be a way to privatise the operation of the Norwegian railroad.  
The publics view on this will be dependent on their personal ideology, and if they are an end-
user to this service. If the service remains the same or better, the public as an end-user can end 
up being happy with the change. If the change offers any personal changes that they find to be 
negative, this will affect their view of the competition.  
 
6.4  SUMMARY  
The goal each stakeholder have influences their expectations for what a public procurement 
competition should be able to achieve. It is not only the procurement of the product or service 
itself but also an expectation of a deliverance covering the different stakeholders expectations. 
These expectations and goals are often conflicting and it is not possible to fulfil them all. 
Each of the different stakeholder group will fight for their own interest, and this is important 
to remember when following the public debate. Our judgement can be clouded by our 
emotions and personal beliefs, and prevent us from seeing the fact. It can be easy to see things 
only from one side, and to get sympathy with peoples fear of loosing their job, or agreeing 
that the equipment supplied in life saving operations should be of the best quality available at 
all times. Some can think it is wrong for public funding allowing public suppliers to make a 
profit claiming that this money could have been better spent giving the public even better 
services, while other say that the introduction of competition enables both better services and 
cost reduction. It is hard to say which is correct, most likely both sides has valid points. Our 
view on the results become clouded by all the different stakeholders fighting for their interest, 
and it can often through the media be portrayed differently than what it is. All these cases has 
generated a lot of debate, politicians and governmental end users has announced their 
disproval with the choices made.  
 
The main goal of public procurement is to supply the service or product needed in a timely 
manner at the best value. An evaluation is conducted according to predefined rules, and even 
if the winner of the competition is an unexpected supplier, according to the rules and 
regulations of public procurement it is not possible to make changes to the outcome of the 
evaluation. They are also bound by budgets awarded by the government and does not have 
unlimited spending, and has to make choices according to this. All these procurement did 
offer substantial saving in cost, while supplying a good quality, despite the public debate who 
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made it out as if quality has been sacrificed for a low price. In none of the cases there are any 
evidence to support this. What there is evidence of are stakeholders fighting to promote their 
own interest. A public procurement should be measured based on its own merits and not on 














Chapter 7   Conclusion 
 
Discussions about public procurement and how public funding is spent offers several 
opinions. The debate about contracting out as a governance model is polarised, which is 
shows in the public debate about the results achieved through some of the competitions 
conducted in the latter years. In order to have a constructive debate it is important to look at 
all the facts and not only facts supporting what we want to see. Part of my motivation for 
writing this paper was that I had gotten an impression through the media that quality had been 
sacrificed for a low price. Despite the governments public comments that quality would be the 
deciding factor, the offers with the lowest price was awarded the contracts.  I wanted to 
explore if this was the case, and I have to admit I expected my findings to be different. During 
my research I realised that all procurement was conducted according to the rules and 
regulation, but also that the result was as one should expect based on procurement theory. It 
got me thinking, why do we have different expectations for public procurement? Why do we 
think it is wrong to make a balanced evaluation of cost vs quality? Some even think it is a 
scandal when the offer with the most economically adventurous offer is chosen instead of the 
one with the best quality. The economic factors, for instance that the offer with the highest 
ranked quality, seem less important in this debate, and I wanted to explore what influences 
our view. 
 
7.1 The relationship between price and quality 
 
Theory about procurement concludes with the opposite, the highest quality comes with the 
highest cost (Valletti, Dini, & Pacini, 2009 p 295). Still for procurement that are connected to 
public safety and health, we seem to have another expectation for what we want the 
government to offer us in terms of quality. There is an expectation that we deserve the best 
possible quality and when reading the papers, who focuses on what has gone wrong more than 
what has gone right it can be easy to draw quick conclusions that quality was offered to save 
money. The of breaking a monopoly for the operation of the Norwegian Railroad and the the 
introduction of competition is a sensitive issue. The debate is often coloured by our personal 
view and not of the facts.  The first impression for all the cases within this research, was that 
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the lowest price won and that despite quality having a higher weight. Despite the public 
communication that quality should be the determining factor, it left an impression that the 
opposite was happening by reading about it in the newspapers.  Throughout this research I 
discovered that the truth is more nuanced than what we read in the papers. We all know this, 
and still it is easy to accept what is written as the truth. It is also easy to let our own personal 
beliefs colour the information we read, and that often stops our ability to be objective.  
 
 The first research question for this paper was: 
What are the relationship between price and quality in an evaluation and how is it affected 
by the choice of procurement procedure? Is quality being sacrificed for a low price? 
 
In a competition with negotiation the offered quality will become very similar, this will make 
the offered price more important for suppliers to be able to distinguish themselves. The price 
is dependent on several different factors and it is up to each supplier how much they will 
sacrifice their profit, how much they are able to streamline their operation or how innovative 
they are able to be to cut cost. This does not mean that quality is being sacrificed for a low 
price. The use of mandatory criteria can ensure that the offered quality from all suppliers is at 
an acceptable level even before the evaluation begins. Through negotiations suppliers are 
guided closer to what is considered to be the optimum quality, and the offered quality from 
suppliers becomes very similar and hard to distinguish in an evaluation. In these kinds of 
evaluation, I would claim that it is through offering a high quality, close to the desired 
optimum, that allows suppliers to be in the final round. When one criteria becomes similar, 
the remaining elements becomes more important for the outcome without taking away the 
importance of the first element. It just means that since all suppliers have done an equally 
good job offering a high quality, the price ends up being what is the determining factor but in 
a different way than the first impression left me to believe.  
  
My findings are from a procurement view as expected. It is not revolutionary that price ends 
up being the deciding factor, what is interesting is how our expectation seem to be that the 







7.2  Why do we have different expectations for public 
procurement and how are these expectations influenced? 
 
Public procurement is not only bound by a more ridged set of rules and regulation than for a 
private company. The rules and regulation gives procurement different considerations that 
affect the way it is conducted from the beginning.  These rules also affect our expectations to 
the results.  
 
For a private company their procurement will have an expectance to help the company make a 
profit and to get best value for their money, the government is expected to find the product or 
service that offers the best value for money, and in addition they are expected to uphold a 
variety of different criteria satisfying the multiple stakeholders. The different stakeholders are 
both external and internal, and they all have an expectation for the public procurement to 
fulfil their personal needs and wants, in addition to the needs of the procurement.  
 
Their focus on the public procurement process is not only just about the choices made for the 
procurement, it can also be a means to an end. In the cases for procurement of Ambulance 
Helicopter Services and Air ambulance aircraft, there were massive critics from the 
paramedics using the service. Their critic can be legitimate and valid, however it is also 
important to know that they can have alterative motive for their critic of the public 
procurement result and the choices made. In one of their interview even stated that “they 
could understand the decision from an economical point of view, but it would require for the 
rescue team to work in another manner when the back up helicopter had to be used.” The 
working conditions for paramedic and rescue personnel are important, the decisions made for 
procurement has to be based on a full picture of what will offer the best total service. It is not 
uncommon that what is the best overall choice can for some users seem like a bad decision. 
Their statements can also be seen as a way wanting to affect the armed forces decision of 
moving their Bell helicopters to the South of Norway. These helicopters were at the time part 
of the ambulance services readiness and stationed in the North. For the decisions made for a 
public procurement competition, this information is not relevant unless it was part of the 
evaluation and overall strategy for the procurement. For the paramedics, criticising the 
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choices made in procurement can be a way to sway the opinions of the public and legislators 
to help influence the decisions of the location of those helicopters, and stop them from being 
relocated to the South of Norway.  
  
For all three cases the government officials responsible for the pronouncement are defending 
the process, and concerned with showing that it has been conducted according to the rules and 
regulation for public procurement While a private company will measure if their 
procurements adds value, public procurement is bound by budgetary constraints awarded by 
politicians. This is shown particularly in case 2, where there were strategic considerations for 
the services that it was not possible to include due to budgetary constraints. How this 
impacted the performance under the contract and the readiness for the population is 
impossible to say.  
  
The legislators have used these cases to push their own agenda, in order to look good for their 
constituents. The government has defended the competitions, and the process. Particular 
introduction of competition within the railroad has been an important project for the 
conservative government, who see contracting out and also privatisation, as an efficient way 
to modernise the public sector. Their communication focuses on the theoretical savings, often 
presenting them as money already saved. In reality no one can tell what the actual savings 
will be before the contract is finished, and even then it can be hard to determine if the 
conditions have changed. That however is a subject for another paper.  The opposition will 
and have used these cases to front their view of competition weakening quality and wage and 
working conditions.  
  
The media coverage of public procurement does without a doubt affect the way the public 
view the services and process, and one important thing I learned writing this thesis is that the 
impression you get from the media, might not be representative of the process that is 
conducted. This is not to say the media doesn't do an important job, keeping the public 
informed and holding the government and other organisations accountable. It is just important 
to be mindful of the fact that everything might not be as objective as we assume.  
As research did show, our personal view will inflict how we view matters, and instead of 





The second research question for this paper was  
 
Why do we have different expectations for public procurement and how are these 
expectations influenced? 
 
Our expectations to the results possible for public procurement, is influenced by our personal 
beliefs of contracting out as a form of governance. Those who view this as a positive 
contribution and a way for the government to cut cost and offer better services, will look at 
the outcome differently, than those who fair that this is a subtle way to privatise public 
services. As research showed, we look for evidence that support our own beliefs. Those 
positive will emphasise on the communication from government official stating the 
procurement has been a success, offering better services for a lesser cost. The ones who are 
sceptical will be inclined to listen to those claiming the procurement haven’t been conducted 
according to applicable rules and regulations, that it has sacrificed quality to cut cost, that the 
conditions for workers has been weakened.  
 
Different stakeholders partaking in the public debate, each wanting to promote their own 
agenda, fuel all of these expectations. The public debate has the power to influence our view 
more than we often realise. The newspapers strive to sell more papers, and “scandal” sells. So 
they have a their own reasons to give room for the critical voices. I think we often look for the 
perfect answer, but the truth is often somewhere in between.  
 
 
7.3 Weaknesses with this paper 
This paper is conducted on the basis on limited information. Preferably an analysis of the 
relationship between price and quality should have been built on the evaluation model and the 
way the evaluation was conducted. However all three cases had classified this as an internal 
document and did not grant access to it. The analysis in this paper is conducted on the data 
after the final offers were submitted, this does not show the progress in the offered quality and 
price offered from suppliers nor does it give any insight on the offers who didn’t make it to 
the negotiations.  The development in the offered quality and price would have been useful to 
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map could have offered more insight on how competition with negotiations as a procurement 
procedure influences the development in the offered price and quality. 
The interview conducted for this paper was conducted as structured interview by email. In 
order to increase the likelihood for responses, I choose to limit the number of questions asked. 
A face-to-face interview would have allowed for a more unstructured interview, and could 
have offered more insight about the process for each case.  
I chose case study as a method for this paper in order to get in depth knowledge of the 
relationship between price and quality in evaluations. The three cases offer insight of 
evaluation mechanisms, particularly for the procurement procedure competition with 
negotiations. However the findings are only indications, and in order for them to offer general 
insight a more thorough research based on quantitative material should be conducted. 
 
7.4 Further research 
During the work with this paper several areas for further research has been discovered. Some 
of them I would have liked to include in this paper put time restrictions prevented this.  
 
The first I would recommend to investigate is how the offered price and quality develops 
through the negotiation. This could offer useful information on the effect of the negotiation on 
the offered price and quality.  
 
Another area of research would be to conduct a quantitative study to see if the difference in 
scoring for quality is statistically less in a competition with negotiations compared to other 
procurement procedures. Is it a trend for within all procurement procedures combining the 
evaluation for price and quality, that the difference in score for quality is less, or is this 
connected to the procurement procedure? 
 
I would also have liked to in investigate why none of the suppliers who publicly claimed that 
the process had not been conducted according to the rules of public procurement felt the need 
to report this matter further to KOFTA? Was it because the process is too time consuming, 
did they not really think the process was wrongfully conducted or was there other reasons for 
them not reporting it?  
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1. Hvilke vurderinger gjøres før man velger vekting mellom pris og kvalitet? 
 
2. Hva var avgjørende for den vektingen man valgte? 
 
3. Ble det gjort noen matematiske utregninger for å komme frem til vektingen? 
 
4. De poengmessige forskjellene for evaluering av kvalitet blir ofte små, mens for pris gir 
det større utslag. Har du gjort deg noen tanker om hva dette skyldes?  
 
5. Det har blitt sagt at i en anbudskonkurranse med forhandling vil forskjell på kvalitet gir 
mindre utslag på score. Er dette noe du kjenner deg igjen i og har du gjort deg noen 
tanker om hvorfor det er slik? 
 
 
6. For anskaffelser med kvalitet som det tyngst vektede kriteriet, er det allikevel ofte det 
tilbudet med lavest pris som blir valgt. Hva mener du kan være grunnen for at pris 
allikevel ser ut til å være den avgjørende faktor?  
 
 
